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THE SYLLOGISTIC OF VALERIANUS MAGNI 209 I e C T . . . motum a motore terdimenso L o C (22) Ta C L o T (32) The conclusions of this chain are supposed to yield a definition of the moon: Lunam (L) esse corpus motum a movente regulariter (R), indefatigabili (I), quod non sit corpus (C) neque substantia terdimensa (T) 24. Such a procedure is described by Valerianus as « discursus huma, nae mentis, in quo exordimur syllogismos a mediis nobis per se notis sine ulla illatione et progredimur ad maiores extremitates nobis ignotas et inde ad alias magis reconditas usque ad ignotissima )) 25 • In the above example of « illatio conexa )) the premises are stated in the order postulated by Valerianus, i.e. minor - major, while the conclusion of the syllogism k-1 functions simultaneously as the minor premise of the syllogism k. Rationale of « illatio conexa r.- is evident. If the traditional order of premises was postulated, i.e. major - minor, one would have to always write the conclusion of the syllogism k-1 again under the major premise of the syllogism k. Thus both epistemological 26 and practical views are responsible for the peculiarities in the formulation of Valerianus' syllogistic. The selection o.f exactly the three « differentiae )) in question was, in addition, motivated by Valerianus' topics, i.e. by the method of finding a suitable middle term ( « medium )>) for a given syllogism 27 • It is, however, not our intention to pursue further methodological ques– tions of Valerianus' logic, which, being closely connected with Vale– rianus' philosophical doctrine of various kinds of « motus ll, exceed the immediate scope of this article. 24.Jbid. 19. 2s Ibid. 26 Note that there are in Valerianus' tracts, apart from the interest in epistemological questions, two more features marking the beginnings of psychologism in the logic of postmedieval period, which he has in common with the Logique ou l'arc de penser of P. Nicole and A. Arnauld, viz. the distinguishing of « operationes intellectus » (Opus philosophicum cit. 10-13) and the use of singular premises (see Section 2.1: « Petrus » instead of « quidam homo»). The same features are characteristic for the .:..ogica Hambur– gensis of J. Jungius (Hamburgi 1638). Cf. I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, transl. I. Thomas, University of Notre Dame Press, 1961, 256s. 21 Opus philosophicum cit. 39.